There is a
blog post on sockpuppet.org arguing that we are not prepared for the
upcoming flood of high-quality, LLM-generated vulnerability reports and exploits.

Now consider the poor open source developers who, for the last 18
months, have complained about a torrent of slop vulnerability
reports. I'd had mixed sympathies, but the complaints were at least
empirically correct. That could change real fast. The new models
find real stuff. Forget the slop; will projects be able to keep up
with a steady feed of verified, reproducible, reliably-exploitable
sev:hi vulnerabilities? That's what's coming down the pipe.

Everything is up in the air. The industry is sold on memory-safe
software, but the shift is slow going. We've bought time with
sandboxing and attack surface restriction. How well will these
countermeasures hold up? A 4 layer system of sandboxes, kernels,
hypervisors, and IPC schemes are, to an agent, an iterated version
of the same problem. Agents will generate full-chain exploits, and
they will do so soon.

Meanwhile, no defense looks flimsier now than closed source
code. Reversing was already mostly a speed-bump even for
entry-level teams, who lift binaries into IR or decompile them all
the way back to source. Agents can do this too, but they can also
reason directly from assembly. If you want a problem better suited
to LLMs than bug hunting, program translation is a good place to
start.

https://lwn.net/Articles/1065586/
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